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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The days from January 29 to March 31, 1968, mark the Tet 
Offensive, the most significant period of time in the 
American war in Vietnam. It will be one purpose of this 
paper to explain this great irony: what was a military 
victory for the American forces should have signaled to 
American leaders that the war in Vietnam was unwinnable. 
Another purpose of this paper will be to demonstrate that, 
because the war was not winnable at a price America was 
willing to pay, and because our leaders could reasonably have 
been expected to understand this after the Tet offensive, all 
American forces should have been immediately withdrawn from 
Vietnam at that time. Our failure to immediately withdraw 
after Tet cost the American and Vietnamese people another 
five years of war, and did nothing to alter the final outcome 
of the struggle. 
It is clear that, looking back in 1990, our war in 
Vietnam did not achieve its objective: saving South Vietnam 
from Communist aggression. What this thesis will attempt to 
argue is that among several alternative courses of action, 
the course of action America chose caused more harm, death, 
and unhappiness than other alternatives would have caused. 
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This thesis will argue that the war in its entirety was 
morally wrong because it simply did more harm than good to 
both Vietnam and America. 
However, I will argue that this result was not easily 
foreseen by a rational American government in 1964, on the 
basis of the evidence available to it. Therefore, while I 
will argue that the war in its entirety was immoral, I will 
also argue that from the our perspective in 1964 the decision 
to wage war was at least rational. I will define a rational 
decision as a decision which, on the basis of the available 
evidence, can be reasonably expected to produce the best 
consequences. 
The crux of my argument, however, is that after the Tet 
Offensive, it ought to have been clear to a rational American 
government that the objectives it sought could not be 
achieved. It should have been apparent that more war would 
only bring more pain and death to Vietnam and America. 
Therefore, on the basis of the available evidence in 1968, 
the only morally correct decision would have been to withdraw 
immediately. 
To summarize the objectives of this thesis, I wish to 
show that our entire war in Vietnam was immoral. I also wish 
to show that in 1964, our decision to wage war could be said 
to be rational, but that by 1968, our decision to continue to 
wage war was clearly irrational. 
The theoretical framework of this paper will be 
explicitly utilitarian. The utilitarian must not simply 
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evaluate the actual consequences of an historical act when 
evaluating its morality. To do so is to get only half of the 
philosophical story. To get the other half, the philosopher 
must evaluate the action from the perspective of an agent 
seeking to perform that act which, given the available 
evidence, was the act which could have been reasonably 
expected to have the best consequences. In this paper, I 
will seek to uncover both halves of the moral dilemma that 
was our war in Vietnam. 
To do so, I will first need to explain and defend the 
utilitarian moral framework within which I will place the 
American war in Vietnam. In the first chapter of this thesis 
I will do so, paying special attention to J.J.C. Smart's 
distinction between that which is 'rational' and that which 
is 'morally right'. His distinction plays an important role 
in this paper. 
In the second chapter of this thesis.the real objectives 




UTILITARIANISM AND A THEORY OF JUST WAR 
Traditionally, ethical theories have been classified as 
either teleological or deontological. Teleological theories 
hold that it is solely the consequences of a given action 
which determine its moral rightness or wrongness. 
Deontological theories argue that the rightness or wrongness 
of an action can be determined by understanding factors other 
than the consequences of the action, such as the nature of 
the act itself, or the motive of the agent. Utilitarianism 
as it is usually understood is a teleological ethical theory 
wherein the consequences of an action are evaluated as to 
whether or not they tend to maximize happiness. 
Perhaps the best known formulation of the utilitarian 
principle is Mill's essay, Utilitarianism. Mill saw a need 
for a first principle of ethics, a standard by which an act 
might be judged to be morally right or wrong. The standard 
he found was utility. 
"The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals 
'utility' or the 'greatest happiness principle' holds that 
actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote 
happiness; wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of 
happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure and the absence 
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of pain; by unhappiness, pain and the privation of 
"1 pleasure. 
Implicit in hedonistic utilitarian theory is the idea 
that the good, happiness, and pleasure are equivalent. I 
will assume a quantitative, hedonistic form of act 
utilitarianism for the purposes of this thesis. It will 
hopefully become clear, as I explain the specific features of 
my theory of just war, that the central arguments of this 
thesis will work within the framework of any plausible theory 
of value. 
For the quantitative hedonistic act-utilitarian the good 
and happiness (as pleasure) are one. According to Thomas 
Hearn, "Utilitarianism is the teleological theory which 
asserts that of the possible acts in a given situation one 
should perform the one which will bring about the most good 
for the most number of people."2 According to Mill, it is 
the sum total of happiness that the utilitarian ought to seek 
to maximize. "The utilitarian standard is .•• the greatest 
amount of happiness altogether."3 In a general sense, then, 
I will assume that actions that maximize happiness maximize 
the good. 
Those who sacrifice their own pleasure for the sak• of 
others (martyrs, for instance) do so because they increase 
the total amount of happiness in the world. Mill's 
utilitarianism recognizes the power of humans to sacrifice 
their own good for the benefit of others, and recognizes acts 
of sacrifice as morally right if and only if they increase 
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the amount of happiness in the world.4 It might be clearer, 
then, if we amend Hearn's statement to say, 'One should 
perform the act which will bring about the greatest net total 
of happiness.' Mill explained that it is not simply the 
agent's own happiness the utilitarian must seek. The 
utilitarian must be a disinterested agent, in that he must 
act so that the greatest amount of happiness is achieved by a 
particular act. If that means that the agent, or another 
individual, must suffer for the greatest amount of happiness 
to be achieved, so be it. The utilitarian has no choice but 
to perform the action which produces the greatest sum total 
of happiness. 
A difficult question presents itself to the utilitarian. 
What, exactly, does it mean to be happy? What is the nature 
of the happiness a utilitarian seeks? No philosopher has 
ever given a conclusive answer to that question. However, 
different forms of utilitarianism have developed different 
ideas of what it means to be happy. 
J.J.C. Smart explained two forms of utilitarianism in 
his essay, "An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics." 
In general terms, it seems that happiness for the hedonistic 
utilitarian is pleasure. For the quantitative hedonistic 
utilitarian, all forms of pleasure can make us equally happy. 
All pleasures of equal quality or intensity are equally 
valuable. For the ideal utilitarian, however, some states of 
mind, such as learning, are intrinsically valuable apart from 
their pleasantness. Viewing quality art, for instance, would 
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have greater value than a sensuous pleasure for the ideal 
utilitarian .. For the hedonistic utilitarian, however, it is 
simply the pleasure itself which makes us happy. Happy 
people, for this type of utilitarianism, have a favorabie 
balance of pleasure and pain. The amount of pleasure, its 
intensity combined with its duration, is equal to the amount 
of happiness received.5 
Mill's unique sort of utilitarianism is difficult to 
place within these definitions. For Mill, certain forms of 
pleasure are more valuable or desirable than others. These 
types of pleasures are more valuable for Mill simply because 
they give us more happiness. The pleasures Mill refers to as 
the more valuable are those which are separate from the 
'animal appetites'. Animals are content to eat, sleep, and 
reproduce; these activities give animals pleasure and 
therefore give them a certain level of happiness~ Humans 
need these pleasures, but if restricted to these animal 
pleasures alone, we will not be truly happy. We also need 
the "pleasures of the intellect, of feelings and imagination, 
and of moral sentiments" to be happy as human beings.6 Once 
we experience these pleasures, we cannot simply be content in 
the lower pleasures. "Human beings have faculties more 
elevated than the animal appetites and, when once made 
conscious of them, do not regard anything as happiness which 
does not include their gratification."7 
Mill claims that those humans who have been exposed to 
both the animal and the distinctly human types of pleasures 
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will indicate a preference for the latter. For this reason 
the higher pleasures are more valuable. Once we have known 
the higher pleasures, Mill argues, we cannot be truly happy 
without them. And, given a choice between the two, those who 
have experienced both will choose the higher.8 
It must be mentioned that, according to Smart's 
definition, Mill is not an ideal utilitarian. The higher 
pleasures of the mind are valuable for Mill because they make 
us happy. According to Smart, the ideal utilitarian holds 
that certain experiences are valuable apart from their 
tendency to give us pleasure and happiness. Mill, however, 
does distinguish between the bodily pleasures and the mental 
pleasures in that the latter are more desirable and valuable. 
The quantitative hedonistic utilitarian will not admit that 
different types of pleasures of equal intensity and duration 
have different value. It is this latter sort of 
utilitarianism that I will assume for the.purposes of this 
thesis. 
Forms of happiness were not Mill's main concern, 
however. His main concern was that the end of all actions 
which are morally right be happiness in general. "The 
ultimate end ••• is an existence exempt as far as possible 
from pain, and as rich as possible in enjoyments."9 
Just as utilitarians have different notions of what is 
intrinsically valuable and ought to be maximized, 
utilitarians also have different notions of how to evaluate 
the consequences of actions. An act utilitarian will wish to 
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evaluate only the specific consequences of a specific action 
when determining that actions moral worth. According to 
J.J.C. Smart, act utilitarianism is, HThe view that the 
rightness or wrongness of an action depends only on the total 
goodness or badness of its consequences."10 In order to 
evaluate an action under act utilitarian principles, one 
simply evaluates whether or not the act has maximized 
happiness. If the act has maximized the amount of happiness 
in the world, or minimized the pain, then that act was 
morally right. If the act resulted in less happiness, or 
more pain, then the act was wrong. 
Opposed to the view that the rightness of an action 
depends of that action producing a state of maximum 
happiness, rule utilitarianism states this: the rightness or 
wrongness of an action is to be judged by the goodness or 
badness of the consequences of a rule that would require 
everyone to perform a like action under like circumstances. 
Rule utilitarianism is a restricted form of utilitarianism in 
that under this theory, acts are judged not as to whether or 
not they specifically promoted the greater good, but as to 
whether or not they follow a rule which promotes the greatest 
good. It is clearly utilitarianism, though, because an act 
must be performed only if, Huniform acc~ptance of a 
corresponding rule would maximize expectable utility."11 
Rule utilitarianism does not simply evaluate an action by 
asking whether or not it conforms to a rule. The act, under 
rule utilitarianism, is not only right or wrong by virtue of 
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the rule it follows, but also by virtue of the utility of 
everyone's conforming to that rule. 
The distinction between rule and act utilitarianism 
stated in general terms is this: act utilitarianism 
evaluates the consequences of specific actions, while rule 
utilitarianism evaluates the consequences of everyone's 
obeying a certain rule or set of rules. If the general 
welfare and happiness is to be promoted by the breaking of a 
rule, then it is clear that under act utilitarian principles, 
the rule ought to be broken. 
It is an unfortunate consequence of act utilitarianism 
that it seems to work best in hindsight. After an act has 
been done, one can evaluate its consequences and decide on 
its rightness or wrongness. However, a utilitarian must 
often make a decision on which act to choose from among the 
available alternatives in order to maximize future happiness. 
It seems clear that as utilitarians, we ought to choose that 
action which seems likely, given the available evidence, to 
secure the greatest expectable sum total of happines~. 
We cannot predict future consequences of actions with 
complete certainty, but we can attempt to understand the 
situation as we would reasonably expect it to unfold, given 
the evidence, if various alternative actions were done. The 
utilitarian simply chooses that action which can be 
reasonably expected at the time to be most likely to maximize 
utility. That which is maximized is expected utility. The 
expected utility of an action is the amount of good an action 
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can reasonably be expected to produce, given the available 
evidence. According to J.J.C. Smart, "All we can do is to 
assign various probabilities to the various possible effects 
of an action."12 
It is quite possible for an action to seem morally good 
according to utilitarian principles before the action is 
done, but later to be proven wrong according to the same 
utilitarian principles. This is inevitable, given the fact 
that humans cannot foresee the future. Smart recommends that 
we use the term "rational" to describe an action which, on 
the available evidence, seems likely to maximize happiness. 
He also recommends that we use the term "right" to describe 
an action which truly does maximize happiness.13 
It seems to me that this distinction is important when 
evaluating historical events. The utilitarian must not 
simply evaluate the real consequences of the historical act 
(as far as they can be determined) when evaluating its 
morality. I believe that to do so is to get only half of the 
philosophical story. To get the other half, the philosopher 
must evaluate the action from the perspective of the agent 
facing several alternatives. 
At this point it will be necessary to make a 
terminological distinction. Looking backwards at an action, 
one can determine its real consequences. From our 
perspective in 1990, we can look back on America's years in 
Vietnam and get a reasonably clear picture of the real 
consequences of our actions in that country during those 
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years. By evaluating these consequences, we can determine 
the real utility of our actions in Vietnam. However, in the 
year 1964, it was only possible to make an educated 
approximation about the consequences of our future actions. 
Faced with a set of alternative actions, and a set of 
probable consequences corresponding to those actions, America 
was forced to choose. In 1964, America chose the course of 
action which seemed most likely to have the best probable 
consequences, and therefore have the greatest expected 
utility. On utilitarian grounds, given the fact that an 
agent reasonably expects on the basis of the available 
evidence that a certain action will give the best 
consequences, the agent ought to perform that act. "If doing 
'A' has, among all the things 'X' can do, the maximum net 
expectable utility, then it is 'X's' duty to do 'A'."14 
The expected utility of an action differs, then, from 
the real utility of an action by virtue of the perspective 
from which the act is viewed. Real utility can be determined 
by looking backwards at the real action and its real 
consequences. Expected utility can only be determined by 
examining, on the basis of all available evidence, what the 
probable consequences of a given action among a set of 
alternative actions will be. 
Unfortunately, it must be admitted that we only know the 
actual consequences of one alternative action in any given 
historical situation. We can make educated guesses at what 
the actual consequences of other alternatives might have 
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been. These guesses, however educated, do remain at the 
level of informed conjecture. We will never know what the 
actual consequences of not supporting South Vietnam 
militarily might have been, but we are in a position to make 
an informed guess as to what the actual consequences would 
have been. This difficulty is not just a problem for my 
thesis, though. It is a methodological difficulty for anyone 
who makes moral judgements regarding historical events. 
At the start of this Chapter I noted that ethical 
theories have traditionally been defined as either 
teleological or deontological. To repeat, teleological 
theories hold that it is solely the consequences of a given 
action which determine its moral rightness or wrongness. 
Deontological theories argue that the rightness or wrongness 
of an action can be determined by understanding factors other 
than consequences, such as the nature of the act itself, or 
the motives of the agent. W.D. Ross, in The Ri1ht and the 
Good, has developed a deontological moral system which might 
be seen as challenging the utilitarian morality. It is not 
my intention in this paper to exhaustively examine Ross's 
theory of what makes an act right or wrong. Nor is it my 
intention to show conclusively that utilitarianism is a 
better moral theory. What I will attempt to do is to point 
out what, from the utilitarian perspective, are two important 
weaknesses in Ross's moral system. 
Ross's system centers on his list of Prima Facie moral 
duties. These duties are guidelines we must consult befo~e 
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we make a moral judgement, A Prima Facie duty is a duty 
which, all things being equal, we have an obligation to 
uphold in action. For Ross, one who acts rightly does so 
without ultimate regard for the total consequences of the 
act, but simply because he recognizes a duty, an obligation, 
to do the right thing. "When a man fulfills a promise 
because he thinks he ought to do so, it seems clear that he 
does so with no thought of its total consequences •.. What 
makes him think it right to act in a certain way is the fact 
that he has promised to do so,"15 This situation, for Ross, 
has moral relevance in that making a promise obligates one to 
keep that promise. All things being equal, one has a moral 
duty to uphold the Prima Facie duties in action. For Ross, 
it is self-evident that in circumstances where one of these 
duties clearly applies and there are no conflicting duties of 
greater moral importance, the morally right act is that act 
which conforms to the corresponding duty, 
Quickly summarized, these are Ross's moral duties: 1) 
To keep a promise, and to right one's wrongful acts; 2) To 
return "services" given; 3) To distribute happiness 
according to merit; 4) To benefit others where possible; 5) 
To improve one;s self where possible; 6) To avoid injuring 
others,16 
There are often situations, Ross admits, where these 
duties conflict, Our actual duty cannot be determined until 
all the circumstances have been determined. In situations 
where the Prima Facie duties conflict, our actual duty will 
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be that Prima Facie duty which is most important. "Besides 
the duty of fulfilling promises I have and recognize a duty 
of relieving distress, and when I think it right to do the 
latter at the cost of not doing the former it is ... because I 
think it the duty which is in the circumstances more of a 
duty.''17 The actual duty will always be a Prima Facie duty 
for Ross, and it may override a different Prima Facie duty. 
An act will be right for Ross if it conforms to the most 
appropriate or important Prima Facie duty. 
The fact that Ross's duties appear to him as self-
evident does not mean that they will appear to a utilitarian 
as self-evident. Dr. Carson writes, "Mill and other 
utilitarians do not think that it is self-evident that 
[certain] acts are Prima Facie wrong."18 The usually 
accepted definition of self-evidence indicates that truths 
which are self-evident will be accepted without question by 
virtue of their own powers. The fact that reasonable 
thinkers could disagree regarding the self-evidence of Prima 
Facie duties indicates that they are only true insofar as 
they are accepted by those who agree with Ross. For this 
reason, utilitarians argue, the truth of Prima Facie duties 
is provided by their adherents, not by the duties themselves. 
The type of acts Ross would claim to be self-evidently 
Prima Facie wrong are acts which break those duties. For 
instance, for Ross it is Prima Facie wrong to break a 
promise. However, breaking a promise may be permitted if it 
fulfills the Prima Facie duty to help others, and if it has 
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been determined that under a certain set of circumstances the 
duty to help others is 'more of a duty' than is the duty to 
keep a promise. Even though breaking the promise is 
permitted, for Ross breaking the promise is still Prima 
Facie wrong. For the utilitarian, though, if breaking the 
promise serves the greater good, then breaking the promise is 
right in all senses, not simply permitted. Utilitarians 
consider no acts right or wrong apart from their 
consequences. Until the consequences (probable or real) are 
understood, the utilitarian reserves judgement on the act. 
It seems to the utilitarian that in almost all 
conceivable moral dilemmas, the duty to benefit others and 
the duty not to harm others ought to carry the greater moral 
weight. The problem the utilitarian has with Ross in this 
case is that Ross provides no real mechanism for ranking 
duties in order of importance. For the utilitarian, it is 
not enough for Ross to simply say that, in a given situation, 
the duty to help others is more important than the duty to 
improve myself because ••• I think it is so. What is to 
prevent the Rossian from reversing himself in the next 
situation, thinking the duty to improve himself 'more of a 
duty'? To rely on intuitions to solve disputes between other 
intuitions is surely to invite moral inconsistency. 
The utilitarian avoids this philosophical trap by 
providing a mechanism to mediate between intuitions. He 
simply works to maximize the good. This is the end of ethics 
for the utilitarian. Ross's deontology has no such end; it 
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is simply a mess of intuitions, none of which are any more 
important than any other, save for the whims of the agent. 
For Ross, however, utilitarianism can lead to absurd 
actions in concrete situations. In a situation where 
breaking a promise would lead to a slight gain in happiness 
or pleasure, the utilitarian would seem to be obligated to 
break the promise. If all the utilitarian is concerned with 
is consequences, Ross might argue, utilitarianism destroys 
the force of moral obligations all of us feel intuitively. 
Taken to its logical extreme, Ross might claim, 
utilitarianism could lead to a society in which moral rules 
(other than those regarding consequences of actions) are not 
observed. If we could no longer trust our fellow man to keep 
a promise, or obey any other moral rule, society itself would 
suffer. 
For Ross, the utilitarian is much too quick to break 
moral rules. If one were faced with a situation where lying 
or breaking a promise would result in a slight increase in 
the good, the utilitarian, Ross claims, must break the rule. 
In a situation where lying would clearly result in a much 
greater benefit to others, Ross could agree with a 
utilitarian and admit that one ought to lie. However, Ross 
would refuse to admit that the lying itself was good. The 
utilitarian would claim that the lie was a part of an act 
which resulted in a greater good, and was therefore right. 
Ross will only admit lying when another duty clearly 
overrides the obligation not to lie. Because there is Prima 
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Facie obligation not to lie, Rossians will only lie in 
extraordinary situations. Because the utilitarian does not 
seem to recognize the intuitive obligation not to lie, it 
seems that he will lie in any situation where even the 
slightest good will result. 
A central objection, as I see it, that Ross would have 
to utilitarianism here is that moral rules (except for the 
rule that mandates maximizing happiness) mean nothing, and 
have no hold on us. The rules, or duties, Ross has explained 
do seem to have a basis in our intuitions. In our ordinary 
life, most of us do seem to feel that lying is wrong. 
Utilitarians, however, will seem to claim that in a situation 
where lying results in any greater good, lying is right. 
Utilitarianism seems to make the claim that our moral 
intuitions, and the moral rules they have given birth to, are 
meaningless. For Ross, to deny the meaning and power of our 
moral intuitions is to deny the ground of .morality itself. 
Utilitarians would answer that the justification for our 
moral intuitions is, in fact, utilitarian. Utilitarians do 
realize that a world in which no one can rely upon anyone 
else to tell the truth would be a confused and dysfunctional 
world. In any situation where lying is an option, 
utilitarians realize that the lie itself is bad for society 
in general, and bad for the individual who lies. The lie is 
bad for society in that it weakens the trust we must have in 
our fellow man to speak truthfully. The lie is bad for the 
individual because it can weaken the intuition we all do feel 
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against lying, and may lead to more lying in the future. 
Therefore the utilitarian, like Ross, will only lie when it 
is clear that a great good will result that will outweigh the 
negative effects of the lie. 
The utilitarian answer to the criticism that 
utilitarians do not admit the power of moral rules is that 
rules are, in fact, an important part of moral life. R.M. 
Hare, for instance, would claim that most of our moral 
decisions can be made on an intuitive level, where rules 
operate. Act-utilitarians of all sorts will admit that it is 
disadvantageous to make utilitarian calculations in every 
moral situation. Society as a whole will work better if 
everyone conforms to a set of moral rules. Only in special 
cases, where rules conflict or do not clearly apply, does one 
make calculations. If utilitarianism demanded that one make 
calculations every time one acted, and refused to acknowledge 
moral rules, Ross' criticisms would be effective. 
Utilitarianism does, however, realize the efficiency of moral 
rules. 
Also, it would be extremely awkward and time consuming 
to be constantly calculating the consequences of one's 
actions. Most individuals simply do not have the time or the 
ability to thoroughly evaluate the expected consequences of 
each and every action. Util(tarianism understands these 
limitations, and requires that moral agents make calculations 
only in special cases. 
The ultimate purpose of this chapter of the thesis was 
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not to establish utilitarianism as the best sort of method 
for solving moral disputes. The purpose of this part of the 
paper was to explain and defend the methodology that will be 
used in my theory of just war, and its application to the 
American war in Vietnam. 
My theory of just war will, of course, be utilitarian, 
but I will refrain from being limited to a certain version. 
It is my belief that explaining and defending a specific 
utilitarian theory will make this part of the theses entirely 
too complicated. In situations such as war, hopefully it is 
clear what good consequences are (gaining freedom for a 
people, keeping a people from oppression, etc.) and what are 
bad consequences (being killed, having one's home destroyed, 
etc.) Any plausible theory of value will say these same 
things. It is not necessary to outline a specific theory of 
value to justify that certain consequences of war are good 
and that certain consequences are bad. 
This theory of just war will keep in mind Smart's 
distinction between the 'rational' action and the 'right' 
action. If the decision to wage war is on the available 
evidence likely to secure the greatest good for the greatest 
number, then fighting is rational. For the war to be morally 
right, that war must in fact have secured the greatest good 
for the greatest number. 
It must be acknowledged that a nation/group's objectives 
can change during the course of a war. It may well have been 
right to fight for unconditional surrender at the start of a 
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conflict. However, it may well also be wrong to prolong a 
bloody conflict in search of that goal. If the greatest good 
will be served by changing the objectives for which a nation/ 
group fights during the conflict, the change ought to be 
made, And if the greatest good would be served by a nation/ 
group's quitting the fight at a particular point in time, the 
nation/group ought to quit the fight at that time. 
Therefore, during a war, it must be continually be asked if 
prolonging the fight is rational. If continuing the war from 
a specific point in time (either in the same manner in which 
it had been fought, or in an altered manner) is on the 
available evidence likely to secure the greatest good for the 
greatest number, then continuing the war is rational. 
Likewise, if continuing the war from a specific point in time 
(either in the same manner in which it had been fought, or in 
an altered manner), did in fact secure the greatest good for 
the greatest number, then continuing the war was right. 
This theory of just war, then, has four separate but 
closely related points: 
1) If the decision to waae war is, on the available 
evidence, likely to secure the greatest good for the greatest 
number, then waging war is rational. Wars which do not meet 
this condition are irrational. 
2) If wagina war did in fact secure the greatest 
happiness for the greatest good, then waging war was right. 
Wars which did not meet this condition were wrong. 
3) If continuing a war from a specific point in time 
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(either in the same manner in which it had been fought, or in 
an altered manner) is on the available evidence likely to 
secure the greatest good for the greatest number, then 
continuing the war is rational. Wars which do not meet this 
condition are irrational. 
4) If continuing the war from a specific point in time 
(either in the same manner in which it had been fought, or in 
an altered manner) did in fact secure the greatest good for 
the greatest number, then continuing the war was right. Wars 
which did not meet this condition were wrong. 
It is clear that acts of war are always violent, 
disruptive, and bloody. It also seems clear that under any 
plausible theory of value, destruction is of negative value. 
When one's home has been destroyed in a bombing raid, or when 
one has received third degree napalm burns, or even when the 
population of one's quiet village has been subject to 
execution, specific theories of value matter little. The 
simple fact of war is this: war has a tendency to cause 
damage to that which makes life worth living. 
For utilitarians, the consequences that war forces on 
both participant and civilian are of negative value. For a 
Rossian, a war such as our war in Vietnam clearly violates 
his duty number six, which states that moral agents ought to 
avoid injuring others. Even for Kant, who stated the 
categorical imperative, it is clear that a maxim which allows 
the kind of destruction that was indiscriminately and 
purposely rained on Vietnam is clearly not a maxim that one 
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would will to be universal law. Under all reasonable 
theories of morality and value, the type of war we waged in 
Vietnam has negative value. To insist on a specific and 
detailed theory of value in a just war theory is only to 
confuse the issue. 
People have a tendency to get killed, or have their 
lives dislocated in horrible ways, in war. As was made 
painfully clear by our experience in Vietnam, it is not only 
those who make war who are subject to this. Civilians can 
and often are victims of war. It seems to be enough to say 
that the destruction war causes to everyone involved is 
obviously of negative value. However, the simple fact that a 
theory of just war is put forth implies that there could, 
indeed, be a just war. Such a war would be a war in which 
the suffering was outweighed by the good gained. Whether or 
not a particular war was a just war, a war which was morally 
right, can only be determined from the backwards looking 
perspective. If the war did, in fact, secure the greatest 
good for the greatest number, the war was right and just. 
The question now becomes, what is the nature of this good? 
It is not the purpose of this paper to get caught up in a 
lengthy metaethical debate, so it will hopefully be enough to 
say that in this context, the good is that which makes life 
worth living in the most basic sense. Necessary conditions 
for a life worth living might be existing without fear, 
oppression, hunger, and being free to pursue happiness in all 
its forms. 
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Which methods ought to be used to pursue this good in 
war? Utilitarians will admit that it is not possible to 
make utilitarian calculations in all situations where one 
faces a moral choice. In war, where combatants face 
extremely stressful situations every day, it is simply not 
possible to demand that utilitarian calculations be made 
before every action. The greatest good will be served by 
admitting a series of rules which can be broken only in 
exceptional situations. Which rules of war, then, would 
countries universally agree to, if they were rational, 
impartial, and believed they might be involved in a war at 
some time? Richard Brandt points out that nations will 
choose rules that maximize utility even if they are self-
interested, for they do not know ahead of time who will have 
the advantage in a particular war, and would not wish to be 
bound by a set of rules which favors the more powerful.19 
Brandt points out also that nations will insist that these 
rules do not impede their chances for victory in war.20 
If we assume that nation/group 'X' was right in waging a 
war, we also assume that their victory will result in the 
greatest good for the greatest number. The only individuals 
capable of preventing 'X' from achieving the good are those 
who fight or support the fight against them. Civilians who 
do not fight, and who are not· actively involved in supporting 
the war effort against 'X' are not impediments to the goal of 
'X'. Intentional, direct, killing or injuring of these 
civilians will do nothing to advance the good, and is 
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therefore wrong. 
It is inevitable, however, that in war civilians will 
die and be injured as a side-effect of operations designed to 
help win the war and secure the good. These bad effects are 
permitted only if the chances for victory, and securing the 
good, are great enough to outweigh the bad effects. Brandt 
writes, "Substantial destruction of lives and property of 
enemy civilians is permissible only when there is good 
evidence that it will significantly enhance the prospect of 
victory."21 
The methods used to secure the good in war must, then: 
1) Not allow the dt~ect, intentional killing or 
injuring of civiliP-ns; 
2) Allow the indirect killing or injuring of civilians 
only when it is clear that such an action will significantly 
aid in securing victory and the good. 
In war, these rules will be violated. It is a simple, 
unfortunate, fact of war that combat troops will kill or 
injure those people who ought not be killed or injured. 
Young men, trained to kill and injure, are not always able or 
willing to distinguish those who ought to be killed and 
injured from those who ought not. This is one of the prices 
of war. One instance of a wrongful killing does not, 
however, make an entire war unjust. 
From a backwards looking perspective, if a war was 
fought by a nation in such a way that the methods it used 
caused so many innocent deaths and injuries that it became 
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disproportionate to the good sought, that war was wrong. 
From a forwards looking perspective, if a nation is causing 
80 much harm to civilians that the destruction becomes 
disproportionate to the good sought, then the methods ought 
to be changed so as to find proportionality between 
destruction and the good to be secured. If this cannot be 
done, any continuing waging of war is wrong. 
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CHAPTER 3 
AMERICA'S WAR IN VIETNAM 
Charlie Company arrived at Landing Zone 'Dotti' on 
January 26, 1968. Their mission was no different from that 
of other American combat units in Vietnam: to locate and 
eliminate Viet Cong rebels. These men had been well trained 
in the art of killing. Their actions in the coming months, 
specifically during Operation 'Muscatine', would prove just 
how well the men of C Company had learned to kill. However, 
it would also indicate in a most graphic manner just how 
chaotic and misguided the American war in Vietnam had become. 
Army intelligence had advised Captain Ernest Medina, 
leader of 'C' Company, that the entire 48th Viet Cong 
Battalion complete with about 250 men had taken a position in 
the hamlet of My Lai4. (My Lai4 carries this number as it is 
one of several numbered sub-hamlets within the larger Song-My 
village.) Medina's orders to Charlie Company were that the 
48th Battalion was to be destroyed, as was My Lai4. Many men 
in 'C' Company thought that Medina had ordered them to kill 
everyone in My Lai4. "When we go in to My Lai, it's open 
season," Medina reportedly said.22 On March 16, 1968, Charlie 
Company was helicoptered into My Lai4 to begin 'Muscatine'. 
Medina's orders had been accepted without question by his 
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men, The civilians of My Lai, knowing that anyone who ran 
from American troops was considered Viet Cong, did not flee 
Charlie Company. The Americans gathered the civilians from 
their huts. As was the case throughout the incident, no one 
in 'C' Company had been shot at or assaulted in any way. 
Upon the orders of 2nd Lieutenant William Calley, 
several civilians were herded into the center of the village, 
According to Paul Meadlo, PFC, this came next: "We stood 10 
to 15 feet away and then Calley started shooting them. I 
started to shoot them."23 Hysterical villagers protested 
their innocence, chanting "No VC! No VC!", but the slaughter 
had begun. Several villagers panicked, and attempted to 
escape. PFC Dennis Conti recalled, "First we saw a few men 
running ..• and then the next thing I knew we were shooting at 
everything."24 
Calley next ordered more civilians to the edge of a 
ditch at the eastern edge of the hamlet. Meadlo reported 
that, "I guess I shot maybe 20 tb 25 people in the ditch ••• 
men, women and children. And babies."25 By the time Charlie 
Company had finished its duties at My Lai4, between 450 and 
500 Vietnamese civilians were dead. PFC Michael Benhardt 
observed that, "We met no resistance and I saw only three 
captured weapons. We had no casualties ••. I don't remember 
seeing one military age male in the place."26 
Perhaps the most telling comment on the My Lai massacre 
came from Private Herbert Carter. "The people didn't know 
what they were dying for and the guys didn't know why they 
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were shooting them."27 It may be possible to understand 
Carter's quote in a wider context, indicative of a war gone 
horribly wrong. 
Just how and why the war was so wrong is one subject of 
this part of the paper. It is important to remember, 
however, that doing what is wrong, and doing what is 
irrational are different matters. To repeat the distinction, 
actions which are wrong are actions which, taken from a set 
of alternative actions, did not have the best actual 
consequences. Actions which are irrational are actions which 
are not, on the basis of the available evidence, likely to 
secure the best consequences. In Vietnam, America did wrong, 
but I will argue that the irrationality of our actions was 
not fully understandable until after the Tet Offensive. If I 
am right, it will become clear that after the Tet offensive, 
not only was America doing the wrong thing in Vietnam, but it 
was also acting irrationally. Moral agents who know (or 
ought to know) that their actions are irrational are 
obligated to stop their actions. America eventually did 
leave Vietnam, but only after five more bloody years of war 
after Tet. 
The events preceding our involvement in Vietnam are 
complex indeed, and it is not the purpose of this paper to 
become immeshed in strictly historical issues. However, a 
rudimentary understanding of Vietnam's history, particularly 
as influenced by French colonialism, is needed in order to 
understand the whole of the Vietnam problem. 
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Stanley Karnow, in Vietnam, A History, notes that as 
early as the fifteenth century Europe had been pursuing 
various interests in Asia.28 (At this time the country of 
Vietnam occupied only the northern two-thirds of the area it 
now occupies. In the Fourteenth Century Champa existed to 
Vietnam's southeast, and the Khmer Empire sat at its 
southwest. To the immediate west of Vietnam then were the 
Thai and Laotian Kingdoms.)29 French missionaries and 
entrepreneurs frequented Vietnam seeking to expand trade and 
spread religious (Christian) beliefs. By 1787 the 
Vietnamese had signed a treaty with the aggressive Frenchmen, 
ceding territory to them, and giving the French exclusive 
trading privileges.30 By 1887, following various Vietnamese 
uprisings and rebellious action against French rule, the 
French conquered Vietnam and set up the "Indochinese Union''. 
All of modern day Vietnam, including Tonkin in the Northern 
region, Annam, and Cochinchina in the South, as well as 
Cambodia and Laos, were subject to French rule.31 
In 1890, Nguyen Sihn Cung was born in the village of 
Nghe An, in Central Vietnam.32 In the coming years, he was 
to personify and lead the rebellion against the exploitive 
and dominating French capitalists who ruled Vietnam. Perhaps 
the words of Paul Doumer, governor-general of Vietnam in 
1902, sum up the French attitude towards the Vietnamese. 
"When France arrived in Indochina, the Annamites were ripe 
for servitude," he wrote.33 Against this uncaring and 
repressive French colonial government, the 'Bringer of 
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Light' rebelled. Ho Chi Minh (Nguyen's pseudonym), the West 
was to discover, would become both symbol and catalyst in a 
determined struggle against any power challenging the unity 
and sovereignty of his beloved homeland. For Ho, there would 
not be two wars, one against the French and one against the 
Americans. For him, the struggle was one protracted battle 
against 'Western Imperialism'. And he simply would not lose, 
regardless of the damages he or his country might sustain. 
On September 2, 1945, Ho Chi Minh proclaimed Vietnam's 
independence during a speech in Hanoi. He borrowed from the 
American Declaration of Independence in an attempt to seek 
U.S. support for his cause. But, as Woodrow Wilson had in 
1919, the U.S. rejected his pleas. Above all, Karnow notes, 
Ho was a "pragmatist, principally preoccupied with Vietnam's 
salvation."34 Ho's decision to turn to Communism for aid 
in the struggle, after the American rejection, was partly a 
commitment to the Communist ideal, and partly a pragmatic 
decision. Ho's studies in Paris with prominent leftists such 
as Jules Raveau had served to push Ho towards socialist 
ideals.35 America's rejections of his pleas for aid, and his 
perception of Socialism as weak, served to convince Ho that 
only the Communists, (namely, Soviets) had the power to help 
ignite a revolution which would free Vietnam.36 
In September of 1940, in a prelude to Japan's entry into 
World War Two, the Japanese invaded and occupied much of 
Indochina, leaving the French government in Vietnam intact.37 
By March 9 of 1945, the Japanese had taken over the French 
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administration in Vietnam.38 After the Japanese capitulation 
in August of 1945, power in Vietnam was given over to a 
provisional government in Hanoi, led by Ho Chi Minh and Bao 
Dai.39 French authorities then regained control of their 
colonies in Vietnam under British auspices.40 Ho's Vietminh 
rebels refused to accept further control by Western powers, 
and rebelled against the French, with a resurrection of armed 
hostilities between the Vietminh and the French in late 
1946.41 
In 1945 the Japanese, cut off by Allied forces from food 
supplies, stole the entire rice crop in Vietnam. The result 
was a horrible famine in which two million Vietnamese starved 
to death. The great suffering felt by Vietnam then boosted 
nationalistic feelings to a fever pitch. Following the 
Japanese surrender in 1945, the Vietminh rebels attempted to 
seize power. Incredibly, the British then replaced the 
oppressive Japanese government in Vietnam with the only 
slightly less repressive French. The Vietnamese Communists 
under Ho Chi Minh were outraged, and were able to rally much 
of the ravaged nation to fight for independence under 
Communist banners.42 
On September 24, 1946, Vietminh rebels attacked the 
French-held Saigon airport and the local prison, where they 
freed hundreds of comrades. War had broken out in Indochina. 
America supported France and their regime in Saigon, headed 
by Bao Dai. The Vietminh rebels, though, were well 
supported, if not in money and hardware, but in spirit. "A 
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nationalistic culture, nearly xenophobic in intensity, 
inspired in Vietminh activists the concept of a virtually 
holy war against the foreign invaders and their native 
clients."43 This intensity was to become manifest at 
Dienbeinphu in 1954, where the French were ultimately 
defeated. 
The stage was set for Geneva, where the Communists would 
sit with the Americans and the French. For Americans, Geneva 
marked the point in time where a South Vietnamese government 
began to be organized; it was where the beginnings of South 
Vietnamese independence were laid down. For Ho and the 
Communists, Geneva simply marked a lull in the struggle for 
Vietnamese independence. 
The agreement at Geneva in 1954 was not a political 
agreement, in that it did not establish boundaries for, nor 
did it establish the existence of, two separate Vietnams. 
Although American officials would interpret the agreement 
differently, the accords simply.called for an end to the 
battles. "The only documents signed were cease-fire accords 
ending the hostilities."44 The country would be divided at 
the 17th parallel. French forces would withdraw from north 
of that line, and the Vietminh would withdraw from the south. 
In the summer of 1956, nationwide elections would be held, 
whereby the nation would be reunified. The U.S., clinging to 
its fears of an international Communist conspiracy, agreed 
reluctantly, but Saigon, led by Ngo Dinh Diem, did not, 
fearing Communist victory. The U.S. would come to back Diem, 
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and support his claims to independence. 
Anti-communist sentiments ran high in the U.S. then, and 
our government was not prepared to capitulate to any 
agreement that might have resulted in a Communist takeover of 
Vietnam. Unfortunately, "the Communists, who had fought to 
unify Vietnam, would not accept the prospect of permanent 
partition", as Diem and the U.S. wanted.45 
By 1955, then, the U.S. had begun to directly fund the 
Saigon government. We also had begun to train and advise 
its army. By 1957, Communist insurgency had started again in 
South Vietnam, and by 1959 North Vietnam had begun to move 
weapons and military advisors of their own into the South via 
the Ho Chi Minh trail. By 1962 the U.S. had 12,000 military 
advisors in Vietnam. 
In 1964 the Tonkin Gulf incident occurred, in which an 
American Navy destroyer may have been attacked by North 
Vietnamese patrol boats in the northern South China Sea. A 
congressional resolution sparked by the incident allowed 
President Johnson to finally intervene in Vietnam without 
going through the arduous process of declaring war. By 1965 
the U.S. had committed ground troops to Vietnam. This 
commitment was both the culmination of a long historical 
process, and the beginning of a tragedy of mammoth 
proportions. 
The first goal of this paper is to argue that, among 
several alternative courses of action available to it during 
the Vietnam War, America failed to choose the one which had 
34 
the best consequences. For this reason, our war in Vietnam 
as a whole was wrong. Five representative course of action 
available to America which I will analyze are these: 
1) Not to fight, or provide aid to South Vietnam in any 
way. 
2) To become involved in the Vietnam slowly, through a 
process of gradual escalation. 
alternative America chose.) 
(This, of course, was the 
3) To fight as hard and as aggressively as was 
politically possible from the start of our involvement, 
sending up to 200,000 men to Vietnam in 1963, and merciless 
bombing of North Vietnam through out the war. 
4) To send an even larger ground force into Vietnam, 
using much less air and artillery power, sustaining heavy 
American casualties, causing less civilian casualties, while 
fighting a strictly guerilla type of war. 
5) To drop nuclear bombs on North Vietnam, and Viet 
Cong strongholds in South Vietnam.46 
The course of action America chose was, of course, 
gradual escalation. lt is possible to speculate on what the 
consequences might have been had America chosen alternatives 
3, 4, or 5, and I will do so later. 
I will begin by examining some of the real consequences 
which arose from America's actions in the Vietnam War. 
It must be remembered that America lost this war, and 
the Communists did take over Vietnam. Had we chosen not to 
fight, the Communists still would have taken over Vietnam. 
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This would have happened without eight years of war with the 
Americans, however. 
Much has been made of the issue of South Vietnam's 
legitimacy as a state following the Geneva Conference of 
1954. Whether South Vietnam was a legitimate state under 
attack by foreign aggression or an illegitimate regime 
propped up by Western interests is not relevant (for 
utilitarians) for the purposes of this paper. The issue in 
this paper is morality, not legality. All arguments 
centering around international law and international 
agreements are therefore not pertinent. Whether it was a 
civil war between the North and the South of Vietnam, or a 
case of over-the-border aggression, one thing is clear. It 
was war. And America chose to involve itself in that war.47 
It is indisputable that America's involvement in the 
Vietnam war, understood in its entirety, failed to secure the 
greatest good for the greatest number, compared to the 
alternative of not fighting. If we had not intervened in 
that war, the Communists would have taken over the whole of 
the country, perhaps in two to three years. (It took the 
Communists about this long to take over Vietnam after America 
withdrew in 1973. Perhaps it would have happened more 
quickly. By 1973 America's actions had weakened the 
Communist fighting capacity somewhat, which may have delayed 
their eventual takeover of the entire country.) As it turned 
out, our actions failed to prevent a Communist takeover of 
Vietnam. Our actions did, however, add greatly to the pain 
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and suffering that country experienced. Our actions also 
cost the lives of some 56,000 Americans. On this simplest 
level, then, our actions were wrong. (The other alternatives 
I have suggested and their probable consequences can and will 
be explored.) 
The issue demands further explanation, however. Exactly 
how did our actions contribute to this great suffering? 
The Communist mind-set in that war was one of steely 
determination. They simply would not allow their country to 
remain severed by foreign powers. Vietminh rebels who fought 
the French at Dienbienphu were of the same mold as the 
Vietcong rebels who would later battle American troops in 
South Vietnam. Ho Chi Minh claimed, "You can kill ten of my 
men for every one I kill of yours. But even at those odds, 
you will lose and I will win."48 It was a failure of U.S. 
policy not to recognize that the national will of the 
Communists was uncompromisable. 
Because of this unshakeable will, and because the 
Communist resistance chose to fight the war by hiding 
themselves amongst a civilian population, America was forced 
to use extreme measures to wage war in Vietnam. My argument 
here is that our methods of fighting did, in fact, allow the 
killing of civilians, many times when it was most decidedly 
not clear that such actions would have significantly 
increased the chances for victory. The problem was that all 
the evidence points to the fact that the U.S. waged this war 
in a manner that did not separate, or distinguish between, 
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combatants and noncombatants. According to Jean-Paul Sartre, 
we had by 1968 begun a systematic destruction of the 
Vietnamese people. "The declaration of America's statesmen 
are not as candid as Hitler's were ... 'Declare you are 
beaten or we will bomb you back to the stone age ... ' They 
[the U.S.] have said: 'genocide yes, but conditional 
genocide'.49 Sartre's point is that one cannot force 
surrender upon a force as determined, and as entrenched 
within a civilian population, as the Communists were. In 
order to defeat such a force, the only option is to destroy 
both civilian and combatant. Consciously or not, we were 
involved in a systematic slaughter of the Vietnamese people. 
In the South, the choice is the following: villages 
burned, massive bombing, livestock $hot, vegetation 
destroyed by defoliants, crops ruined by toxic aerosols, 
and everywhere indiscriminate shooting, murder, rape, and 
looting. This is genocide in its strictest sense: 
massive extermination, •• Is it any different for the 
North? ••• Not just the daily risk of death, but the 
systematic destruction of the economic base of the 
country .•. of hospitals, schools, places. of worship ••• 
Deliberate attacks against civilians.SO 
Sartre's arguments are emotionally powerful. And they 
are based solidly in fact. 
Journalist Jonathan Schell recounts the BENTON bombing 
operation carried out against supposed Vietcong hideouts in 
the Quang Ngai province in 1967. An area of several square 
kilometers was targeted, wherein the VC supposedly had taken 
refuge. The area had been declared a 'free-fire zone', which 
meant that anyone in it was fair game for our bombers, 
artillery, and ground troops. Schell recounts, "I flew fo~ 
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two weeks with the forward air control planes, and what I saw 
day by day was the bombing of the villages and their burning 
by combat troops."51 In the end, "an area inhabited by 
17,000 people was about 70 percent destroyed with no 
warning."52 
The most infamous case of civilian deaths in Vietnam 
was, of course, My Lai. Unfortunately, there was more than 
one such incident. Robert Lifton notes, "No soldier I have 
talked to has been surprised at the news of My Lai ... They 
have either been party to, or witness to similar or smaller 
incidents."53 My Lai became a symbol for American policy, it 
seems, because of the face-to-face interaction of murderer 
and victim. More destructive than any ground operation could 
have been, however, was the rain of fire American bombers and 
artillery dropped on that country. Indiscriminate bombing 
runs, and the policy of free-fire zones, violated the 
generally accepted principle of noncombatant immunity 
flagrantly, dislocating scores of civilians, and producing 
countless refugees. 
The problem for our military was that it was sometimes 
impossible to distinguish the enemy from the civilian 
population. The harder it became for our soldiers to find 
the enemy, the more villages we destroyed, and the more bombs 
we dropped. Unfortunately, "1hese approaches are 
intrinsically utterly indiscriminate- they strike entire 
populations ••• virtually an entire people is America's 
enemy."54. 
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The policy that seems to have been the least 
discriminating and the most destructive was that of the 
'free-fire zone'. Inside a free-fire zone any and all 
Vietnamese are assumed to be the enemy. Civilians are then 
subject to bombing, artillery strikes, and sometimes 
relentless ground assaults in which any hut or house not 
destroyed by the bombs or artillery might be burned to the 
ground. "A free-fire zone is an area in which, by official 
declaration, there are no friendly forces or populace and in 
which targets may be attacked on the initiative of U.S. 
commanders ••. Since everybody is an enemy, everyone and 
everything becomes a target."55 To get at VC who live and 
hide amongst peasants, it was official if undeclared policy 
to kill all the peasants, if need be, to uncover the enemy. 
Warning leaflets were sometimes dropped into the villages 
prior to the assault, describing the bombing that would occur 
if the civilians continued to allow VC to reside there. It 
was not explained in the leaflets how unarmed peasants were 
to deny armed rebels access to their villages. 
A larger problem with American policy in free-fire zones 
was that in at least half the cases, camps of VC were 
mislocated, or VC were not there when the bombs fell on the 
peasants.56 In free-fire zones, as well as in other 
indiscriminate bombing missions, the relation between policy 
and reality blurred badly. Huts were bombed, and then 
classified as "military targets destroyed", and areas were 
targeted for bombing on little more than cursory inspections 
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of areas from 5,000 feet in the air.57 Regardless of 
official protestations to the contrary, there was little, if 
any, effort on the part of those participating in the bombing 
and shelling of villages to distinguish combatant from 
noncombatant. 
It would be impossible to ignore our use of chemical 
warfare in Vietnam. In particular, the use of napalm and 
herbicides was destructive to noncombatants. "Napalm, a 
highly incendiary fluid that clings, has the capacity to maim 
permanently and induce slow death ••• its use in Vietnam has 
involved many civilian and peasant families."58 In the case 
of such a destructive and horrifying weapon, special care 
ought to have been taken to keep it away from civilian 
populations. It cannot be argued, even from the standpoint 
of military necessity, that it was right to drop napalm on 
noncombatants. If the only way to keep our troops in Vietnam 
safe was to drop napalm, artillery, and bombs 
indiscriminately on civilians, while at the same time using 
more than one hundred million pounds of herbicide to destroy 
the natural environment (59), we ought not to have been in 
Vietnam at all. 
The attitude of a U.S. Army Captain describes fairly 
well the disdain Americans had for Vietnamese civilians, and 
the reluctance of American troops to even attempt to sort 
enemy from peasant. "One Captain was asked how he knew a man 
he had just shot running out of a hut was a VC, said, 'Son, I 
know he's a VC by the nine bullet holes in his chest'.60 A 
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U.S. Special Forces estimate concluded that we were killing 
or wounding ten civilians for every VC.61 
American policy, I conclude, failed miserably to 
distinguish combatant from noncombatant. "Translated into 
human terms, the U.S. has made South Vietnam a sea of fire as 
a matter of policy, turning an entire nation into a target," 
62 It is not my intention to indict the footsoldier or the 
bomber pilot. It is, however, my intention to indict the 
military system and policy that manufactured him. Our 
military leadership as a whole is responsible for its failed, 
destructive policy. 
It is undeniable that the individual must take a certain 
amount of responsibility for his actions, but it is not 
possible to burden him with full responsibility. It was the 
system that trained him to kill, and it was the system that 
taught him to follow orders without question, it was the 
system that put him in Vietnam, and most importantly it was 
the system that had made explicit the policy that refused to 
distinguish combatant from noncombatant. It was American 
leadership, then, from the President on down to military 
policy makers, who failed to separate civilian from enemy in 
Vietnam. In no way was the senseless manner in which the 
U.S. waged war in Vietnam right under the principle of non-
combatant immunity. 
The senselessness to which Schell (and others) refer, it 
seems, is the impossibility of defeating an enemy who, 1) 
refuses to be beaten, and, 2) hides himself among a civilian 
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population. By fighting the way we were fighting, I do not 
think such an enemy can be defeated without utterly 
destroying him and those around him. However, fighting a 
true guerilla war would have meant increasing the amount of 
our ground troops greatly, and reducing the amount of our 
protective firepower, which would have resulted in a much 
higher rate of American casualties. Politically, it does not 
seem that America was willing to accept these higher demands 
in order to fight in such a way as to confront a guerrilla 
force on its own terms. As a result of our reluctance to 
accept these demands, we were left with the above 
difficulties. 
Was the cost to America and Vietnam worth the strugale? 
We accomplished nothing in Vietnam. We did, however, 
"shatter Vietnam's economy, disrupt its social texture, and 
exhaust its population in both the North and the South."63 
About ten percent of the entire Vietnamese population, more 
than 4 million soldiers and civilians, were killed in the 
war.64 America lost over 50,000 men. It is clear that our 
war in Vietnam did not achieve the greatest good for the 
greatest number, compared to the option of not fighting at 
all. 
There were alternative courses of action America might 
have chosen to pursue in the Vietnam war. Alternative #3, to 
fight as hard and aggressively as possible from the start of 
our involvement, sending 200,000 men to Vietnam in 1963, and 
merciless bombing of North Vietnam throughout the war, was 
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one of these other options. Understanding that the following 
is mere speculation, what might have happened if we had taken 
this course of action? 
It is important to remember that America's entry into 
the Vietnam war began slowly, with small amounts of troops 
and military advisors. In 1963, when Kennedy was 
assassinated, America had only 16,263 military advisors in 
South Vietnam.65 Various advisors to Kennedy, including 
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, indicated to Kennedy 
that a quick and large build-up of American forces in Vietnam 
would bring the crisis to an end. Kennedy was advised that 
as many as 200,000 troops would need to be immediately 
deployed, and that air strikes against North Vietnam would 
need to be launched, in order to control the situation. 
McNamara was convinced that "maximum U.S. forces required on 
the ground in Southeast Asia will not exceed ••• 205,000 
men."66 These advisors were convinced that Kennedy was, 
"trying to accomplish a very large objective ••• on the 
cheap."67 
Unfortunately, the approach Kennedy's advisors expounded 
ignored two important factors: the limits of air power, and 
the very nature of the struggle in Vietnam. 
In a struggle mostly fought by guerilla forces, air 
power will not succeed in destroying an enemy's will or 
ability to fight. America never understood this simple fact. 
"President Johnson believed that carefully controlled bombing 
would ultimately compel Hanoi to end the war by making it too 
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costly."68 Others in that administration, like National 
Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy and Secretary of State Dean 
Rusk were convinced that bombing would "break Hanoi's will to 
fight".69 
It does not appear that American air power had such 
capabilities. Viet Cong rebels needed only a small amount of 
material to fight. "No amount of bombing could stop a meager 
amount [of materials] from reaching the South."70 For that 
reason, destroying the population centers of the North, or 
its agricultural system, would not have had a great effect on 
the war in the South.71 Even if American air power had 
succeeded in halting Hanoi's support of the VC, it was not 
certain that the VC would have stopped fighting. "The 
cessation of Northern support was no guarantee that Saigon 
could survive against the Viet Cong."72 
The failure of America to understand the limits of its 
air power indicated a failure to understand the very nature 
of the war itself. For Norman Podhoretz, even a large and 
immediate American entrance into the Vietnam war would not 
have been effective. "Yet even if Kennedy had taken [his 
advisors] advice and gone in fast as well as big, the chances 
are that the result would have been futility."73 Faced with 
a guerilla war, America had prepared for and attempted to 
fight a massive conventional war. Initially, America 
attempted to prepare the South Vietnamese Army for a 
conventional over-the-border invasion by the Communists, not 
realizing that the bulk of the war in its early stages was to 
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be fought by local resistance. Later, when America entered 
the war, "The Army chose not to adapt to the unique 
environment of Vietnam, instead conducting big-unit 
operations against bands of guerillas, and relying too 
heavily on technology and the lavish use of firepower."74 
Given the reality of these two grievous 
misunderstandings by the United States, it seems that a more 
aggressive entrance and posture in Vietnam would not have 
assured victory. "In short, it seems reasonable to conclude 
that the only way the U.S. could have avoided defeat in· 
Vietnam was by staying out of the war altogether."75 It also 
seems reasonable to conclude that such an aggressive option 
would only have resulted in more death and destruction than 
did the option we chose, and the end result, a Communist 
takeover of Vietnam, would not have changed. Most probably, 
this option would not have achieved the greatest good for the 
greatest number compared with the other options I have 
listed. 
The final option I have listed is the option of extreme 
aggression. We could have chosen to drop nuclear bombs on 
North Vietnam and on VC strongholds in South Vietnam. This 
option would simply have eliminated anyone in Vietnam who 
stood in the way of American goals. This option would 
clearly have caused more harm than any other option. We 
would have literally destroyed most of the country of 
Vietnam, killed many more civilians than we actually did, and 
we may well have scared or angered Russia enough to start 
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World War III. For these reasons, this course of action was 
not considered a real option by America. I examine the 
option only as a logical possibility. 
There, then, are five representative options America 
faced in the Vietnam war. They range from the option of not 
fighting at all to the option of extreme aggression. A 
Communist takeover of Vietnam was inevitable, given the 
Communist will, the Communist method of fighting (which 
America could never understand or deal effectively with), and 
our own military limitations. Therefore, the option which 
would have kept the pain and suffering in that situation to a 
minimum was the option of not fighting. America failed to 
choose this option, and therefore acted wrongly by fighting a 
war in Vietnam. 
Likewise, the methods America used to wage war in 
Vietnam tended to allow the killing or injuring of civilians 
when it was not clear that such actions would have 
significantly aided in securing victory and the good. The 
indiscriminately destructive nature of military actions such 
as in My Lai, or free-fire zones, resulted in unnecessary 
civilian deaths. For this reason, as well as the others I 
have outlined, our war in Vietnam was wrong. 
Given the situation America was faced with in 1960, 
however, our decision to fight in Vietnam can be said to be 
at least rational. However, given the situation America was 
faced with in 1968, our decision to continue to fight cannot 
be said to be rational. Just why this is so is the subject 
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of the final portion of this paper.76 
As I mentioned previously, J.J.C. Smart has explained 
the difference between that which is right and that which is 
rational. I would argue that, in the evaluation of an 
historical action, the distinction hinges on the perspective 
in time from which one views the action. If one is at a 
point in time where several courses of action are being 
considered, it is not possible, strictly speaking, to know 
which action will be the 'right' one. All it is possible to 
do from that perspective is to choose that alternative which 
is, on the available evidence, likely to produce the best 
results. After the action is completed, it is possible to 
judge the real consequences of the actions, and thereby judge 
the rightness or wrongness of the action. The terms 
"rational" and "irrational" are to be used "to appraise 
[actions] on account of their likely successes."77 I would 
argue that our initial decision to wage war in Vietnam was a 
rational decision. In order to· show that this decision was 
truly rational, two points must be demonstrated. The first 
point is that the goals we sought in that war did at the time 
seem most likely to represent the greatest good for the 
greatest number. The second point is that, at the time, it 
could have been reasonably concluded that we would succeed in 
obtaining those goals in an armed conflict. (If it could not 
have been reasonably concluded that we would succeed in 
Vietnam, then deciding to fight there was a decision that 
could only be reasonably expected to raise the body count,· 
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contribute nothing towards obtaining the good, and would 
therefore be irrational.) 
Proving conclusively that Democracy is a better 
political system than Communism is remains the task of 
political scientists. However, I think it is safe to say 
that, given the economic failure and oppressive nature of 
Communism in the world today, Democracy is the method of 
government which has the better chance of affording the 
citizens of a given country a prosperous and good life. 
While the notion of a 'Communist conspiracy' to take 
over much of the world seems ridiculous to us in 1990, this 
notion did not seem so far-fetched in the years after World 
War Two. "By 1947 there were alarming signs that the Soviet 
Union had no intention of surrendering control over the 
countries of Eastern Europe •.. Further, the Soviets were 
employing local Communist parties to subvert non-Communist 
countries like Greece and Turkey."78 A policy of 
'containment' was developed by the Truman administration, 
indicating that, "It must be the policy of the U.S. to 
support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation 
by ••• outside pressures."79 The North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization was formed to resist Soviet efforts to claim 
more of Europe. In 1950, the United States went to war in 
Korea, extending the principles of containment to Asia; we 
left little doubt that America would indeed use military 
force to stop the spread of Communism.SO There was, then, a 
policy in place to support a defence of South Vietnam, and a 
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precedent in which America had demonstrated her willingness 
to use force to support that policy. 
Given that American intervention in Korea resulted in 
keeping that country from falling completely to Communism, 
and given the relative prosperity of South Korea, it could be 
said that our intervention there did, in fact, secure the 
best consequences. If American intervention in Korea, where 
Communist aggression was halted, secured the good, it can be 
argued that America could have also logically expected to 
secure the good in fighting Communism in Vietnam. 
Kennedy argued that America had a real interest in 
protecting South Vietnam from Communism. If Saigon fell to 
the Communists, "Burma, Thailand, India, Japan, the 
Philippines and obviously Laos and Cambodia ••• would be 
threatened."81 This infamous 'domino' theory, which held 
that losing South Vietnam would leave many other countries 
vulnerable to a Communist takeover, is not held in high 
regard today. From Kennedy's perspective, however, given 
Communist aggression in Eastern Europe and China, and what 
was to happen in 1962 during the Cuban missile crisis, the 
threat of a Communist offensive throughout Southeast Asia 
must have seemed very real. Ultimately, Kennedy argued, if 
we did not squarely face this threat in Southeast Asia, "The 
United States, inevitably, must surrender the Pacific and 
take up our defenses on our own shores."82 It seems 
reasonable that, given the aggressive activities of 
Communists worldwide from the period immediately after World 
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War Two up to the time when America finally committed ground 
troops to Vietnam in 1965, America would come to feel (during 
that same period of time) that the stability of the non-
Communist world, and, by logical extension, its own future, 
was at stake. Given that situation, I would argue that the 
only rational decision would have been to oppose Communism in 
Southeast Asia. 
If we did not do so, some thought, would that not signal 
to the Communists that they had free reign to overtake 
various countries at will? ''Vietnam represented a test of 
American responsibility and determination."83 How could 
America claim to be on the side of the right and the good if 
it permitted those who were on the side of evil to overrun 
South Vietnam? How could the nations of the free-world 
depend on America if it turned its back on South Vietnam? 
America concluded, rationally it seems, that if it were going 
to truly represent and stand for the good, it must stand 
squarely against that which was not good. 
There could be no argument that those who threatened 
South Vietnam were Communistd. "The Vietminh rebels [who 
fought the French, and who would later evolve into the 
Vietcong) were certainly Communists and they were clearly 
tied to the international Communist movement. Their leader, 
Ho Chi Minh, had actually founded the Communist party of 
Vietnam, he had been trained in Moscow, and his forces were 
now being supplied by the mainland Chinese."84 And, 
immediately after the French had been defeated at 
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Dienbienphu, America could claim that Saigon was no longer 
tainted by Western colonialism. "There was now an indigenous 
non-Communist government in South Vietnam."85 
America was faced with a situation it could not turn 
away from. The only remaining question was, could we expect 
to achieve our goals through armed conflict in Vietnam? This 
is a most difficult question to answer, in that the true 
scope of the problem in Vietnam did not present itself 
immediately. There was never a time, in the early 1960's, 
where it was obvious that America was committing itself to 
eight years of brutal war. If we had know in 1962 what we 
know in 1990, that the Vietnamese rebellion was incredibly 
well-organized, unbelievably determined to win, extremely 
hard to locate in an utterly foreign terrain, and very easily 
supplied, perhaps our decision to fight would have been 
different. As it was, we only learned these things as we 
fought our way through the jungles of Vietnam. The question 
remains, could we have learned these things before we decided 
to fight? I do not think so. 
We did, in fact, attempt to learn about the Vietnamese 
and the nature of the struggle there. 
No conflict in history was studied in as much detail as 
it was being waged. Officials from nearly every 
Washington agency would conduct surveys in Vietnam ••• 
They included weapons technicians, economists, 
sociologists, political scientists, anthropologists, 
biologists, chemists, and public opinion pollsters. They 
investigated the effects of defoliants, the impact of 
bombs, the efficiency of cannon. They scoured villages 
and interviewed peasants. They interrogated enemy 
defectors and prisoners. They pored over captured 
Communist documents ••• 86 
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But even with all this study, no answers to the 
Vietnamese problem was found. It seems reasonable to 
conclude that, if America could not answer these questions 
during the war, after it had been exposed to the situation, 
it would have been impossible to answer these questions 
before the war, before we had been exposed to the situation. 
What we did know in the early 1960's was that Communism 
was threatening South Vietnam, and that South Vietnam needed 
America's military assistance. This we gave, in small 
amounts at first, but in increasing amounts as the problem 
came to be seen as increasingly larger. We gave this 
assistance in part because we were certain we were on the 
side of the good, and in part because we were confident we 
would succeed. Unfortunately, we were confident we would 
succeed because we failed to understand exactly what would be 
required for America to win in Vietnam. What makes our 
confidence at the time reasonable, howeve~, was-that it was 
impossible to understand that winning was impossible until we 
were involved in a full-scale war.87 
Given the historical/political conditions which made 
Vietnam a war we could not turn away from, and our reasonable 
confidence that we would be successful there, I would 
conclude that America's decision to wage war in Vietnam was 
rational. This does not mean that this decision was right. 
My point is only that, given the available evidence in the 
early 1960's, America did choose that action which could 
reasonably have been expected to reap the best consequences. 
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However, in deciding to continue to wage war after the 
Tet Offensive in early 1968, America did not choose that 
action which could have been expected to give the best 
consequences. The Tet Offensive began on January 29, 1968, 
and was concluded March 31, 1968. The Offensive was an 
organized Communist assault on the cities and military 
strongholds of South Vietnam. It was designed both to 
overwhelm the anti-Communist forces in South Vietnam and 
stimulate a general uprising by the people of South Vietnam 
in favor of the Communist cause. It was a bold move 
militarily. Never before in this war had the Communists 
attempted an attack of this nature or scale. "The People's 
Liberation Armed Forces and elements of the Vietnam People's 
Army had gathered for synchronized assaults on cities, towns 
and military headquarters throughout South Vietnam. For 
years they had been men of the jungle, daring in boast and 
banner but cautious in the commitment of major military 
assets. Now they would emerge everywhere."88 
The Communist hope was that during the celebration of 
Tet, the Vietnamese lunar New Year's celebration, their enemy 
would be unprepared for attack. They hoped to stretch the 
American and South Vietnamese defences to the breaking point, 
and they hoped to ruin the government of South Vietnam in the 
process.89 The Communists had committed nearly 70,000 troops 
to the Offensive, almost one-quarter of their entire force.90 
In these objectives the Communists failed. "In many 
places, they were swiftly crushed by overwhelming American 
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and South Vietnamese military power."91 The battle for the 
Mekong River delta in southernmost Vietnam, and the battle 
for Hue' in the North of South Vietnam, illustrate the nature 
of the Offensive. In the Mekong delta, the South Vietnamese 
defences proved poorly prepared for the Viet Cong assault. 
"There was no alarm, in many cities, until enemy troops began 
firing in the middle of town."92 South Vietnamese officers 
balked under the intense pressure of the Communist attack; in 
one delta province an American adviser found the province 
chief wearing a set of civilian clothes under his military 
uniform in order to facilitate a quick getaway.93 Finally, 
American firepower was able to secure the delta area, but the 
Viet Cong attack had made a clear point, even though, as was 
the case with the entire Tet Offensive, the Communists failed 
to hold any territory. 
The Viet Cong, though, were well-organized, more so than 
the Americans had thought, and they were frighteningly driven 
to achieve victory. The Army of South Vietnam, however, 
revealed themselves to be less than heroic. "For a fleeting 
instant, some of the hidden realities of Vietnam were 
illustrated ••• These included the determination and 
fanaticis•- heroism, one might say- of the Viet Cong officers 
and men, and the failure of will and nerve of a number of 
South Vietnamese officers."94 Indeed, the Viet Cong had lost 
in the Mekong delta, but their Offensive had demonstrated an 
unexpected tenacity, and it had shown just how unprepared 
this part of South Vietnam was to defend itself. 
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The battle for Hue' was a tremendous struggle, easily 
worthy of its own chapter in a military history of Vietnam. 
I will try to explain the highlights of this battle in a 
brief manner. "The twenty-five day struggle for Hue' was the 
longest and bloodiest ground action of the Tet Offensive and, 
quite possibly, the longest and bloodiest single action of 
the war."95 On the night of January 31, 1968, two North 
Vietnamese battalions mixed with Viet Cong forces began their 
attack on Hue'. 
Among their targets were the military airstrip, an 
ammunition warehouse, a police station, and the U.S. military 
advisor's compound.96 Some of the heaviest fighting occurred 
in the walled Citadel, a holy place within Hue' where relics 
of ancient Emperors and ancestors were held. The fighting in 
and out of the Citadel was brutal house-to-house combat, with 
Americans rooting out the Communist troops occupying the 
city. Marine troops fighting northward from the Military 
Advisors Compound were able to gain only four blocks in seven 
days, during which they sustained heavy casualties.97 
Progress in the Citadel was slower still. It was clear that 
Communist forces in Hue' were fighting with the same fierce 
resolve that their comrades in the Mekong delta had 
displayed. Furious attacks on American positions in Hue' 
continued until the sheer number and power of American and 
South Vietnamese forces were able to overtake the final 
Communist strongholds in Hue': the Citadel itself and the 
suburban Gia Hoi area. By February 24, these strongholds had 
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been cleared.98 
The damage to Hue' itself was extensive. Nearly 80% 
buildings in the city itself had been destroyed or damaged by 
artillery.99 The brutality of the Communist forces became 
apparent when a mass grave containing 2800 bodies was found; 
the bodies were those of Southern Vietnamese government 
personnel.100 
As was the case in the Mekong delta, extraordinary 
actions by American troops managed to take back what 
territory the Communists had gained. (It must be admitted 
that, though, in Hue' the 1st South Vietnamese Division's 
elite 'Black Panther' Company distinguished itself in the 
fighting.101) The heretofore unseen courage and 
determination of the Communist forces surprised the American 
and South Vietnamese forces, as did the ability of the 
Communists to organize and carry off such a massive 
operation. 
It must be remembered, however, that the Tet Offensive 
was a military loss for the Communists. The Offensive had 
failed to scatter the enemy, it had failed to stimulate a 
popular uprising, it had, in the end, failed to win the war. 
"Where was the glorious victory? What happened to the 
seething revolutionary masses •• ? Where were the legions of 
puppet troops who were ready to turn their guns around and 
join the revolution? Where was the light at the end of the 
tunnel?"102 The end of the war was not yet in sight; the 
Communists, who had thought victory was within their grasp, 
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must have known then that the struggle would be longer than 
anyone had imagined. But they would not give in. As Don 
Oberdorfer reported, "No hard information is available on the 
state of mind of the .•• Vietnamese Communist movement."103 
It is not possible to know the extent of Communist morale 
after Tet. It is possible to know this, however: they did 
not quit the struggle. After a crushing military defeat, a 
defeat which was from the Communist point of view was 
supposed to have been a glorious victory, a defeat in which 
the Communists lost perhaps 40,000 men (104), they kept 
fighting just as hard as they had before. 
From the American point of view, what did all this mean? 
First, it was clear that, while the Communists were not 
winning the war, neither were we. "The Communist attacks on 
the cities of South Vietnam show that we don't have the 
country under any kind of control and that we are in a much 
worse position than we were in two years ago," claimed 
Eugene McCarthy.105 When General Westmoreland asked America 
to send an additional 206,000 troops to Vietnam on March 9, 
1968, claims that we were winning the war seemed to take on 
even less credibility. "If so many Communists were killed 
and their Army routed, why were 206,000 more Americans 
required? If this 206,000 were dispatched to war, what 
assurance was there that another group of 206,000 would not 
be needed then, and another after that? Was there no end to 
this bottomless pit •. ?"106 
What should have been clear to the American government 
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by April of 1968 was that we were not going to win that war. 
It should have been clear by then that our best efforts were 
not injuring the will of the Communists. It should have been 
clear by then that our massive air force was not effective 
against an enemy who had little or no industrial targets. As 
a young American fighter pilot reported to a group of White 
House aids in February of 1968, "We were going through the 
worst fucking flak in the history of man, and for what- to 
knock out some twelve foot wooden bridge they can build back 
a couple hours later?"l07 All these things should have been 
clear to the American government after the Tet Offensive, 
but, judging from the fact that the last American combat 
troops did not leave Vietnam until March 29, 1973, apparently 
these things were not clear. Nixon's foggy notion of 
achieving a 'peace with honor' only served to prolong an 
already bloody war. By April of 1968, it was not reasonable 
to believe that the Vietnam war was winnable. 
If a war is not winnable, and the good is not 
achievable, prolonging hostilities simply adds more death and 
destruction to an already grim scene. As I see it, our 
options at this point were these: 
1) Stop fighting and withdraw immediately. 
2) Withdraw slowly, maintaining an active combat 
presence, while attempting to give the responsibility 
for victory to the South Vietnamese. 
3) Increase our efforts greatly. 
The rational alternative in any situation is the one 
59 
which holds the most promise, given the evidence an agent has 
about that situation, to have the best consequences. The 
best consequences may be those in which the good is 
maximized, or the best consequences may be those in which the 
bad is minimized. In the case of Vietnam, since it was clear 
that we were not going to achieve what we had determined at 
the time to be the good, the best consequences would be those 
in which the bad was kept to a minimum. Also, it must be 
pointed out, alternative three was not possible. By spring 
of 1968, due in part to the political reverberations of the 
Tet Offensive, a large segment of the American public had 
lost its patience with the war in Vietnam. It is extremely 
doubtful that public opinion would have allowed any increase 
in troop number past the 540,000 troops we had in Vietnam at 
the end of 1968.108 Therefore, this final question remains, 
was the rational decision in 1968 to keep fighting, while 
withdrawing slowly and attempting to turn the war over to the 
South Vietnamese, or was the rational decision to withdraw 
immediately? 
The question here is not whether or not our continuing 
the war after the Tet Offensive was right or wrong. That 
issue has already been decided. As I have explained earlier, 
our entire war in Vietnam was wrong. It must be noted, 
however, that even under our strategy of gradual withdrawal, 
we did an extreme amount of damage to Vietnam after the Tet 
Offensive. Edward Herman reported, "The continued use of 
American air and artillery power in the cities of Vietnam 
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since the Tet Offensive has created more refugees, destroyed 
more allied property, and killed more civiiians in the urban 
area than all the VC rocket and mortar attacks during the 
entire war."109 (Underlining mine.) It seems clear, then, 
that continuing to wage war after the Tet Offensive was wrong 
because it failed to achieve the greatest good for the 
greatest number. But was the decision to continue to wage 
war after Tet rational, i.e., was the decision on the 
available evidence likely to secure the greatest good for the 
greatest number? 
Let us examine one of the key goals of our slow 
withdrawal strategy, Vietnamization. Under this strategy, 
the war was to be turned over slowly to the South Vietnamese. 
Two points are relevant here. The South Vietnamese had never 
been tested in major operations without American help. Also, 
the reason America was involved in that war in the first 
place was that South Vietnam had desperately needed our 
military assistance in the early 1960's. There was no 
evidence to suggest that the South Vietnamese Army was 
capable of winning the war without significant American aid 
in 1969 or at any time thereafter. A failed South Vietnamese 
excursion into Cambodia and Laos in 1970 that was intended to 
destroy parts of the Ho Chi Minh trail demonstrated that, in 
fact, South Vietnam was incapable of fighting without 
American aid.110 
Vietnamization was doomed to failure because the South 
Vietnamese Army, with the exception of a few elite units, was 
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simply not competent enough nor enthusiastic enough to defeat 
the Communists. After nearly ten years fighting alongside 
them, American officials must have been aware of the military 
deficiencies of the South Vietnamese. 
If, as it seemed clear after the Tet Offensive, the war 
in Vietnam was not going to be won by American efforts, or by 
South Vietnamese efforts, or by and combination thereof, the 
only rational decision would have been to stop fighting. 
Difficult and depressing as it may have been to simply give 
up, to abandon South Vietnam to a Communist takeover, 
continuing to fight was clearly an option that would have 
(and, in fact, did) have worse consequences. Both America 
and Vietnam were subjected to five years of unnecessary war 
because of our decision to continue to fight after the Tet 
Offensive. What makes the decision to keep fighting after 
Tet irrational is that we should have known by then that the 
war was unwinnable. Our failure to understand this simple 
fact made the period of war from mid 1968 to 1973 not only 
wrong but irrational. 
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